Rabinismos

Ontem tava revendo o belo Evangelho de Pssolini e me veio uma questão: as críticas de Cristo ao rabinismo, por exemplo, em relação à interdição de todo e qualquer trabalho no dia de sábado ( o exempolo da vaca que se afoga, etc). Cristo era o homem Justo, na tradição hassídica, uma dimensão do judaísmo que privilegia a ética: a ação justa, a boa ação. Enfim, a ação ( a obra) pelo Outro. Lucas 7:18- 7:23: "Voltem e anunciem a João o que vocês viram e ouviram: os cegos vêem, os aleijados andam, os leprosos são purificados, os surdos ouvem, os mortos são ressuscitados e as boas novas são pregadas aos pobres".

Como na democracia: a democracia é um regime político, logo um regime que visa à consecução de ações, boas ações para a comunidade, etc, mas o sistema – os meios- acabam por dominar e muitas vezes entravar os fins: a ação. Assim, a burocracia, as réplicas de réplicas de réplicas, etc, viram as estrelas do show businesse miserável, quando deveriam servir ao sistema de ações, mesmo que devidamente limitadas ( digo: enquadradas), legisladas, legítimas e legalistas, etc.

Um sintoma, que evidencia uma questão, talvez a mais dolorosamente pertinente para o judaísmo inter-testamentário: como estar à altura de sermos os herdeiros, únicos e absolutos de Deus ( de seus valores e de sua concepção cósmica, mas a princípio era de Deus como entidade política mesmo) se nós, entre nós ( nós, a tendência no poder à época, o rabinismo), nunca chegamos nem chegaremos a um acordo, se não somos capazes de empreender a ação que nos torna justamente os aliados e herdeiros de Deus, desta corrente de reconhecimento e de implicação de uns pelos outros, de criaturas a criaturas ao Criador- esta corrente ou cadeia ( para alguns mais lúcidos) que é Deus, o selo que fecha o círculo: se não somos capazes, enfim, com nossos sofismas e rondas intermináveis e inescapáveis, de doar/legar uma ação em nome de um Outro?

E quando falo em legar, leiam assim: gerar um futuro, fecundar um tempo, uma descendência, reproduzir ao longo do tempo uma ação ou um pensamento. E quem disse que o pobre e desgraçado Messias meia boca, Jesus Cristo, não deixou uma vasta, mesmo que muitas vezes equívoca e tão meia boca quanto ele, descendência?

Comentário

"But what it does not acknowledge is that this impotence is itself a kind of potency in that it carves out a space in which the subject can live by limiting the Other and thus rendering it impotent."


O horizonte essencial da experiência ética.

et encore....

In his provocative essay "The sacrifice of sacrifice", Frank Wande Veire notes that one of the core innovations of early Judaism was the shift from ritual human sacrifice to law-based observance, the biblical proof text of which is God's intercession on behalf of Isaac at the moment when Abrahaam preçpares to slit his son's throat. Vande Veires argues that the corollary of this shift is the fact that is no longer possible to manage divine terror: God can no lonbger be seduced or appeased with gifts. The result is a "spiritualization" of sacrifice, which now takes the form of unconditional respect for the Law. In this sense, the non-sacrifice of Isaac corresponds to a demand for a entirely uneconomic, unconditional sacrifice, one that can be required at any moment, without advance warning. As an example, he ckigtes the infamous episode from the Book of Exodus, where God, after having called Moises to be his prophet, suddendly decides to kill him. Moses is saved only by the ingenious ruse of Zipporah, who quickly circumcises their infant son and touches the bloody foreskin to Mose's feet, effectively circumcising him and so warding off the demonic attack ( Exod. 4:24, 26). Veire interprets this impromptu circumcision to be a reminder that God can at any time impose his insatiable demands. In this reading, the act of circumcision is not so much a protection against divine terror as an extension of it, a mark of the Israelite's profound subjection to the destructive force of divine wrath.

I would interpret this episode differently, however. For me, this passage best expresses the srakes of circumcision in the Jewish tradition, in which it appears as a barrier against the deity that is intimately related to the function of speech as a limit against the Voice. The act of circumcision is not just a submission to the deity's exorbitant demands, but a talismanic protection against them. It is a purely symbolic sacrifice- and ultimately a rather modest one- that serves to ward off something much more radical. Having verified Mose's circumcision, God is no longer at liberty to strike against the mere mortal who stands helpless before him; he cannot further demand a arm, a leg, and so on. As the act that seals the covenant with God, circumcision is not only a demand imposed from without, but a pact. Most obviously, it is a mark of election that identifies the subject of the covenant as under God's protection, but more importantly, it is an act that protects its subject against the unmediated wrath of God himself. Israel's covenant with God is mutually binding contract, one that commits both parties to certain obligations with respect to one another ( although there is n o denying, as Veire quire rightly observes, that those obligations are asymetrical , and that God has a fairly-open-ended time frame in which to make good on his promises). In this sense, the law limits the satisfaction not only of the subject who submits to it, but also of deity himself.

In the epistle to the Romans, Paul argues that to live under the law is to live with the impossibility of ever fulfilling the law, since lone would have to fulfill its precepts in their entirety, something the flesh can never achieve ( Gal. 3:10). It is true that the Jewish Law cannot be "fulfilled", but to the extent that one lives within its confines, it nonetheless functions as a protective barrier against something that is considerably more difficult to live with- the limitless jouissance of the Other. Lacan says of the Ten commandments that "whether or not to we obey them, we still cannot help hearing them- in ther indestructible character they prove to be very laws of speech". This is because "the condition sine qua non of speech" is the "distance between the subject and Das Ding, the deadly jouissance that represents the ultimate "fulfillement" of the subject, its annihilation or absorption by the superegoic Other. In contrast, consider the notion os "sinning in the heart" elaborated in Jesus's Sermon on the Mount, which holds that to think lustful thoughgts about a woman other than one's wife is already to commit adultery, even in the absence of an adulterous act. By this logic, it is no longer possible to fulfill the Law simply by not transgressing it or by avoiding the object it deskignates as abject. As a result, the Law loses its function as a protective barrier.

The difference between the two ethics can best be illustrated by reference to the commandment against lying, or "bearing false witness". Lacan suggests that this may be the cruelest commandment of all because the subject is inseparable from the ability to lie. But if there is a commandment against lying, it is because, in the context of Hebraic law, it is possible to lie; in Judaism there is no supposition of divine omniscience. Conversely, when Jesus introduces the notion of sinning in the heart, and thus the transparency of the heart to God, he suggests that it is no longer possible to lie. In this process, he lifts the barrier against the deity that is so central to Judaism. In this vein, the glospel of John famously asserts that Christ "dwells in us". While Christian doctrine tends to emphasize the positive side lof this cohabitation( the Christian is not alone, is redeemed from his fallen state, and so on), it also introduces as ominous new possibility, one markedly absent in Judaism: the subject's radical exposure to invasion by the deity. In this sense, the psychotic Doctor Schreber's fantasy of being anally raped by God is not so much a delusional departure from the logic of the Christianity as an intuition of the superegoic violence implicit in the intimate relationship between God and man.

According to Badiou, the message of Paul's Gospel is that "we can overcome our impotence, and rediscover what the law has separated us from". This reading posits the Jewish law as one in which the subject is impotent with respect to the all-powerful Other. But what it does not acknowledge is that this impotence is itself a kind of potency in that it carves out a space in which the subject can live by limiting the Other and thus rendering it impotent. In other words, what the Jewish law has "separated us from" is not merely the object that would complete or fulfill us, but the superegoic jouissance of the Other. Paul's treatment of the law casts a new light on the problem of the pact as a protection against this violence. In this sense he is very much the heir of Jesus, who çpresents himself as the one who violently breaks apart all pacts, separating brother from sister and father from son. As he says in the gosçpel of Mattews, "I have not come to bring peace, but sword" ( Mat. 10:34). The stakes of this position become clear in Paul's reversal of the attitude toward the law implied in Jacob's struggle with the Angel, a reversal whose implications are far reaching and sometimes contradictory. This struggle seems to be already implied or encrypted in the even t of Damascus, as a heritage it both alludes to and displaces. On the road to Damascus, Paul, like Jacob, is waylaid by the Angel of the Lord. Both men are travelling alone in anticipation of a possible confrontation: Jacob with his brother Esau, Paul with the Christian converts of Damascus. In both cases, the divine intervention results in a wound: Jacob is made lame, and Paul is temporarily blinded. Both men are renamed, and both events result in new covenants: the naming of Israel as the heir to Abraham's promise and the "new alliance" with the Gentiles that will become Paul's special mission.

... a continuar.

... continuando

"Jean-François Lyotard suggests that Paul interrupts this struggle in his appeal to the mystery of incarnation: ' The Word was made Flesh and came among us: is this not to announce that the Voice voices itself by itself, and to say that it asks not so much to be scrupulously examined, interpreted, understood and acted so as to make justice reign, but love?' The struggle that defines Jewish ethics is thus inverted: it is no longer the "angelism" of the Voice that one must struggle against, but the letter of the Law that limits this euforic insistence. The Voice demands no to be examined and enacted, but "loved".

What, then, is the meaning of "freedom" that Paul proclaims, the freedom revealed to him by the Voice? On the one hand, it involves a freedom from the Law in its proscriptive formulations, on the other, it implies an identification with a principle behind the law that both fulfills it and renders it obsolete. In this regard, Paul is very much an ancestor of Kant, since, as Hannah Arendt observes, "Kant's spirit is the demand that a man... go beyond the mere call of obedience and identify his own will with the principle behind the law- the source from which the law sprang". But they are also radically different, in that for Kant this "principle behind the Law" is practical reason, whereas for Paul it is the authority of the Voice.

In making this distinction, I am borrowing from Juliet Flower MacCannell's work on fascism and the voice of conscience, which is a reading not of Paul, but of Adolf Eichmann. The architect of Hitler's final solution claimed to be guided in his moral conduct by Kant's categorical imperative. Following Harendt, MacCannel suggests that the "principle behind the law" with which Eichmann identified was not practical reason, but the will of the Führer, incarnated in the Voice as object a 1. Flower assimilates his position to the structure of the perversion, which Lacan defines "as a response to the jouissance 2 of the Other as voice, rather than to the Other as speech.". For him, speech is defined as the field of the symbolic pact, "the social contract that divides us from each other as mutual agressors". By contrast, "Voyce is already object a;the embodiment or bearer of a 'principle behind the law'.It took shape in Lacan's discourse as one of the four fundamental objects a ( gaze, voice, breast, feces) around which the fantasy that structures drive circulates".

Speech, as the field of the signifier, works to limit the insistence of jouissance by erecting barriers against it, while the voice as object a is a bearer of the deadly jouissance that insists within the fantasy. Thus, speech as pact protects against not only the aggression of others, but also the aggresion of the voice itself. In the structure of the perversion, the pervert foregoes the protections offered by the law, "identify(ing) himself with the object a in its role as agent of the Jouissance of the Other. In Sade's work, for instance, this identification is evident in the libertine''s attention to the maternal voice, which appears in the form of the uncastrated "voice of Nature" that guides him in his systematic critique of symbolic authority.

In appealing to this argument, I do not mean to imply that Paul is a fascist or a pervert ( although I would not exclude the second possibility, which is arguably the upshot of Nietzsche's notorious psychological study of the apostle). What is striking is that for Paul, nothing comes to limit the authority of the Voice. As Lyotard writes, "Neither Jewish signs nor Greek proofs will be offered. Every intermediary is bypassed. You will hear the incarnation only if the incarnated Voice speaks to you, speaks through you, in you. " Or, as Paul himself puts it in First Corinthians, "What no eye has seen, nor ear heard, nor the heart of man conceived, what God has prepared for those who love him', God has revealed to us through the Spirit... and we impart this in words not taught by human wisdom, but taught by the Spirit, interpretting spiritual truth to those who possess the Spirit. The unspiritual man does not receive the gifts of the Spirit of God, for they are folly to Him, and he is not able to understand them because they are spiritually discerned. The spiritual man judges all things, but is himself to be judged by no one ( 1. Cor. 2:9-10, 13-15). In Paul's claim that the mystery can only be discerned spiritually, whitout ever passing through speech, we see the insistence of what Levinas calls the "angelism" of the Law, which appeals to a spiritual "principle behind the law" that underlies- but also supercedes- the Law's authority.

What does it mean to say, as it does in the final line of this citation, that the "spiritual man" is "judged by no one?" Of course, the spiritual man is not subject to the judgement of the law, wielded by those wo are "jealous" of the Christian's freedom. But this is not simply a question of "getting off" without judgement because the cost of being judged by no one is to profoundly deliver oneself over to the violence of the Other in the form of the absolute authority of the Voice. And Paul says again and again, "I was freed to the law so that I might become a slave to Christ." And after the event of Damascus, the Acts of Apostles attributes to Jesus the words: "I myself will show him how much he must suffer for the sake of my name" ( Acts, 9:16). As Slavoj Zizek has argued, the most horrifying, superegoic dimension of God is witnessed not in Judaism, as often maintained, but in Christian love itself. Levina's reading is insightful in that it locates this superegoic quality in the spirit of "angelism"of the Law, which in its very generosity veers in the direction of what he calls "Stalinism".

Amazingly, Paul makes the exposure to this superegoic violence the very basis of ethics, and in so doing identifies not simply a hermeneutic error or a lack of faith, but a several ethical failing or cowardice in the refusal to open onself to the Voice- not just to its love, but to its violence. Perhaps this is what Lacan means when he claims that "Christianity naturally ended up inventing a God such that he is the one who gets off", a God of limitless jouissance. Israel, on the other hand, is not always so eager to surrender to this enjoyment; she has reservations about exposing herself to the "love" of God without protection. In this respect, it is significant that Levinas ' reading of the angelism of the Law appears in a reading of a Talmudic passage concerning the handing down of the law at Sinai, which implies a very different conception of the Voice. In his commentary on the Hebrew decalogue, introduced by the verse "and God spoke all of these words ( all together)""( Exodus, 20:1), the medieval rabbi Rashi suggests that the voice of God took the form of a single terrifying utterance, so unbearable that the people of Israel begged Moses to shield them from God's voice by speaking the commandments for them, mediating its awesome force. This gloss contests the stock reading according to which Judaism is said to be marked by the tragedy of God's absence, his withdrawal from the "dead" letter that signals his retreat from the human community. Rashi makes clear that the Israelite's relation to God is marked by a profound dread of the unmediated divine presence, an insight that casts the stakes of the Jewish law in a different light".

Notas:

1. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Objet_petit_a

2. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jouissance

...a continuar

Understanding the sick and the Healthy: a view of World, Man and God, Rosenzweig


Link para baixar:


http://www.mediafire.com/?jzjweonnzqt

Nota provisória a reter:


O pacto juadaico com Deus: Eu ( D’us) castro uma parte do meu poder e transformo minha onipotência Absoluta em uma instância relativa ( relativa a interesses de terceiros, a regras e mandamentos de uma comunidade de “condôminos” ou de partners), a Lei, mediação legalmente compartilhada ( compartida pelos homens).
Em compensação, vocês também se castram: me dão uma parte do teu pau ( da Vossa Natureza), e nesta violência mútua - nesta inscrição mútua na matéria de uma ausência , de um invisível, do abstrato da Lei e da circuncisão, se instaura um fundamento por corporação -há entreprise mais duradoura?- : a cultura.
Paulo, o psicótico, por sua vez , desconhece a mediação do concurso/discurso da Lei, e só ouve a Voz ( que supõe ser de D'us, mas nunca se sabe, pois a labirintite habita todos os aparelhos auriculares, inclusive os santos), que ressoa em seu coração; a ela obedece, pura, afetiva e idólatramente, mas não a interpreta. Diferença, portanto, entre a Lei ( instância hermenêutica, a ser discutida e rediscutida) e o affectum, que isola o homem na plenitude autista de seu coração.

Satã!

A luta com o Anjo

Bem, eu vou me dar ao trabalho de traduzir em capítulos curtos aqui um texto foda de Tracy mcnulty, chamado The whrestling with the angel, um texto realmente significativo, senão eu não o poria aqui.

Agora, peço o favor de se alguma alma caridosa tiver a disponibilidade ou masoquismo de passar por este blog empoeirado, que dê um alô, um "que texto legal" ou "que texto merda", ou simplesmente avisem se lêem, porque geralmente me sinto um autista, mantendo um blog que sequer é conhecido por judeus. Ok, o propósito do blog é aprofundar meus interesses e pesquisas, mas em relação a isto bastaria torná-lo secreto, o que me seria mais do que suficiente. Só pra saber se não estou escrevendo para D'us , este Alter sem Ego que, como bem sabem, nunca Responderá.

The wrestling with the Angel

Tracy mcnulty

"We have only the following account of Paul's famous conversion on the road to Damascus in the Acts:

Now as he was going along and approaching Damascus, suddendly a light from heaven flashed around him. He fell to the ground and heard a Voice saying to him: "Saulo, why do you persecute me?" He asked: "Who are you, lord?". The reply canme, "I am Jesus, whom you are persecuting.But get up and enter the city , and you will be told what you are to do'. The men who were traveling with him stood speechless because they had heard the voice but saw no one. Saul got up from the ground, and through his eyes were open, he could see nothing; so they led him by the hand and brought him into Damascus. For three days, he was without sight, and neither ate nor drank"( Acts, 9:3-9).

Alain Badiou notes that after the event of Damascus, Paul turns away from any authorith other than the Voice that personally called upon him to become a subject. But what exactly does that Voice say? Although it speakes to him, it does not transmit specific directives or a particular interpretation of the gospel. Instead, it initiates an unscripted "conversion experience" that follows its own course , one that differs from bot Moises ans the Hebrew prophets, all of whom are convinced as mouthpieces for the speech of God.

What is the significance in Paul's writing of this fidelity to the Voice- the Voice that interpellates Paul on the road to Damascus, but also the inner voice of the Christian liberated from the law, the voice of freedom? In Paul's discourse, the Voice is opposed to Greek wisdom adn to Jewish signs and aligned with the mysterious "demonstration" of the spirit: "For Jews demand signs and Greeks desire wisdom, but we proclaim Christ crucified, a stumbling block ( skandalon) to Jews and foolishness to Gentiles, but to those that are called, bot Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God ( 1 Cor. 1:22- 24).

While the Voice has an authority that supercedes prophecy and reason, it is itself strangeli inarticulate. Consider this curious passage from the second letter to Corinthians, where Paul speaks in the third person of his interpellation by the Voice: "I know a man in Christ who fourteen years ago was caught up to the third heaven- whether in the body or out of the body I do not know, God knows. And I know that this man was caught in the Paradise- and he heard things that cannot be told, which man may not utter ( 2, Cor. 12: 2-4). He does not hear- or at least cannot convey- what the Voice says to him, but only the fact that it calls upon him. What I want to consider here is the status of this autority of Voice in Paul's discourse and its relation to the problem of faith. What is at stake in Paul's insistence that the Jews open theirs ears to a Voice beyond the Law? And why is the Jewish tradition unable or unwilling to hear this voice?

Emmanuel Levinas, in an essay entitled "The pact", comments on a passage from the Babyloniam Talmud concernig the handing down of the Law to the people of Israel. In this passage, the rabbis note in the scene of law-giving reported in Deuteronomy, the Israelites are commanded not only to obey each individual interdiction of the Law, but also to uphold "all the words of this Law". The Law is to be taken in its entirety in its general spirit. But why , Levinas asks, does the Law demand both a particular and a general form? He writes:

Can the adherence to the Law as a whole , to its general tenor, be distinguished from the "yes" which is sait to the particular laws it spells out? Naturally, there has to be a general commitment. The spirit in which a piece of legislation is made has to do be understood.. For there to be true inner adherence, this process of generalization is indispensable. But why is it necessary to distinguish between this knowledge of the general spirit , and the knowledge of its particular forms of expression? Because we cannot understand the spirit of any legislation without aknowledging the law its contains. These are two distincte procedures, and the distinction is justified from several particular points of view. Everyone responds to attempt to encapsulate Judaisme in a "few spiritual" principles. Everyone kis seduced by what might be called the angelic essence of the Torah, to which many verses and commandements can be reduce. This "internalization" of the Law enchants our liberal souls and we are inclined to reject anything which seems to resist the "rationality" or the "morality" of Torah. "

Although Paul's name never apperas here, the passage seems to engage with Paul's polemic not only in questioning the reduction of the law to its "spirit", but also in its affiirmation of the very reasoning that Paul criticizes under the joint headings os "Greek wisdom" and Jewish signs. Crucial to Levinas reading, however, is an inattention to anything like the Voice. He notes that "Judaisme has always been aware... of elements within it which can not be immediately internalized. Alongside the mishpatim, the law we call all recognize as just, there are hukkim, those unjustifiable laws in which Satan delights when he mocks the Torah. Despite the absurdity of the ritual of red heifer, the arcane alimentary prohibitions, and even the act of circumcision, Levinas argues that we cannot dismiss these sometimes incomprehensible adherences as unnecessary or irrelevant compared to the general adherence to the "spirit" of the law. The letter of the law offers a necessary check to what he calls "the angelic essence" of the Law, its purely spiritual dimension.

Levinas then reads the biblical story of Jacob's struggle with the Angel as a cautionary tale about the dangers of succumbing too readily to the "angelisme" of the Law. He writes: "There is a constant struggle within us between our two adherences: to the spirit and to what is know as the letter.Both are equally indispensable, which is why two separate acts are discerned in the acceptance of the Torah. Jacob's struggle with the Angel has te same meaning: the overcoming, in the existence of Israel, os the angelisme or not-worldliness of pure interiority. Look at the effort with which this victory is won! But is it really won? There is no victor. And when the Angel's clasp is released it is Jacob's religion which remains, a little bruised". The Angel represents "spirit", but also the lure of "pure interiority", an identification with the Law in which it would cease to be Other. Thus kit is important to Levinas'reading that the being with whom Jacob wrestles is not God, as Jacob himself believes, but an Angel. As a purely spiritual being", the Angel is "a principle of generosity, but no more than a principle. Of course, generosity demands an adherence. But the adherence to a principle is not enough; it brings temptation with it, and requires us to be wary and on our guard. " What exactly is the temptation? That general principles, and even more generous principles, can be inverted in the course of their application or, as Levinas puts it, "All generous throught is threatened by its own Stalinilism".

This threat is acknowledge in the rabbi's creation of the oral law, the Talmud. According do Levinas the Talmud "is concerned with the passage from the principle embodied in the Law to its possible execution, its concrete effects. If this passage were simply deducible, the Law, in its particular form, would not have demandede a separate adherence. Talmudistic casuistry tries "to identifie the precise moment within it when the general principle is at risk os turning into its opposite: is surveys the general from the standpoint of the particular". In this way, says Levinas, it "preserves us from ideology". In short, "the Talmud is the struggle with the Angel". On the onde hand, is is the struggle not to "recognize" the angel or to presume that one is familiar with its essence. On the other, it is also the admonition to struggle against a danger that presents itself under the guise of generosity- and perhapes even love".

... a continuar.

Big bang

De um e-mail que mandei hoje:

"Meus prosaicos estudos de judaísmo me levaram, por exemplo, a Catherine Chalier; ela é maravilhosa, trabalha o feminino no judaísmo através da dimensão da Escuta. Se pararmos pra pensar, Deus nunca foi “figura” ou imagem”, ele sempre se fez ouvir: ele sempre teve um lado mais feminino que masculino, pelo menos na tradição judaica.
Até porque, segundo o esquema de que finito e infinito são podem por natureza ocupar o mesmo espaço e tempo- sob o risco do pobre finito se foder neste confronto impossível, neste face a face de consciências desiguais-, a “imagem” do Divino equivale à fulminação do finito, e com a fulminação do finito, nada de testemunhas. E sem testemunhas, que Deus haveria, não? A “invisibilidade” de Deus- interdição de sua imago- preserva não só a existência do finito, mas igualmente a essência do próprio Deus, na medida em que Ele necessita de testemunhas que o “revelem”, através da palavra; precisa de alguém –finito- que resista ao próprio Deus, ao seu voraz abismo de ausência de significação.

Sem a palavra do homem, este ente dotado do acesso ao próprio ser, para Heidegger, Deus tb não seria, ou antes: Deus seria relegado ( não seria) ao seu limbo originário, à morada brumosa, aconchegante, grisâtre, espectral que é o seu casulo: o Nada.

O impossível contrato

"Au témoignage d'un chroniqueur postérieur, Guillaume de Malmesbury, ce roi ( Guillaume le Roux) décide un jour d'organizar un débat entre ses évêques et des Juifs lettrés, promettant qu'il se ralliera à la foi des chrétiens: les évêques ont pejur d'être vaincus! Le chroniqueur omet de nous raconter le dábat mais n ote que "les Juifs ne rétirèrent que de la confusion, bien qu'ils se fussent vantés d'avoir été vaincus pour des motifs politiques et non par la raison ( non ratione sed factione)- réflexion qui n'est pas invraisemblable, étant donné les problèmes qu'aurait posés la conversion d'un souverain chrétien au judaïsme.
L'un des plus célèbres débats en présence d'un roi est celui que nous raconte Joinville dans son Histoire de Saint Louis; la réflexion attribuée au "bon roi" paraît bien éloignée de l'idée de charité chrétienne:

"Nul, s'il n'est très bon clerc, ne doit disputer avec un juif; mais le laïc, quand il entend médire de la loi chrétienne, ne doit pas défendre la loi chrétienne, sinon de l'épée, de quoi il doit donner parmi le ventre dedans, autant qu'elle y peut entrer""


!!!!!!!!

"Cependant, les débats de ce genre ( entre chrétiens et des juifs) finirent par inquiéter les autorités religieuses. Une crainte ancienne s'exprime de plus en plus à partir du XII siècle: que les juifs, qui connaissant bien l'Ancien Testament et dont on pense souvent qu'il nais manient avec subtitlité les ressources de la dialectique, arrivent à "séduire" facilement les "simples" chrétiens, ignorants et peu préparés à des joutes oratoires. C 'est une raison souvent alléguée dans les commentaires du droit canon pour justifier les mesures d'isolement des juifs ou l'interdiction faite aux chrétiens de prendre des repas avec eux; elle est clairement énoncée dans le canon du concile de Bourges ( 1276), qui veut éloigner les juifs des petites villes:

"A propos des juifs, dont l'incroyance trompe fréquemment d'une manière frauduleuse les simples chrétiens et les entraîne avec malice dans l'erreur, nous avons jugé bon, avec approbation du saint concile, d'ordonner qu'ils demeurent dans des cités, places fortes ou autres lieux de renom".

"Que nul ne dispute avec un hérétique ou un juif à moins d'avoir les sens exercés. C'est en effet à cause des discussions illicites et imprudentes qu'à partout poussé l'insidieuse végétation des hérésies... Il est absurde de parler de la Trnité aux carrefours, et de faire de la génération éternelle du Fils un objet de scandale, dans l'arène de la controverse publique."


Pierre de Blois, 1206

"Dans le dispute avec les juifs, il faut observer une triple précaution: 1. Efforcez-vous de réfuter leurs erreurs dans des nombreuses discussions, tant parce qu'il est plus facile de réfuter les articles de leur foi que d'appuyer sur des preuves ceux de la nôtre, que parce les graines des vertus et de la vérité ne servent à rien si ne sont d'abord extirpées les épines et les mauvaises herbes de la fausseté. 2. Ne touchez pas aux objections qui paraissaent être contre nous, à moins que le juif ne les ait produites de lui-même. Alors, résolvez-les comme vous en aurez trouvé la résolution. 3. Quand vous disputez en présence de plusieurs juifs, faites-les tous taire, excepté un seul qui répondra, jusqu'à ce que, celui-ci ayant été vaincu, un autre réponde; vous éviterez ainsi qu'ils ne vous assomment de leurs clameurs et que, alors que l'un d'eux prend la parole, un autre ne tente de trouver des échappatoires et de détourner l'attention".


Thibaud de Sézanne, Pharetra fidei contra Iudeos, 1240.

"Nous sommes amenés à leur poser des questions qui ne sont pas prévues dans le cours du débat; ils se mettent alors à aller dans tous les sens et quand ils se sentent encerclés, ils sautent de lieu en lieu, à la façon de renards pris au piège: et là où on imagine qu'on les tient le plus sûrement , ils ont tôt fait de nous glisser entre les mains, si nous n'avons pas devancé leurs ruses".

Pierre Damien, 1234.

Citações extraídas de La polémique chrétienne contre le judaïsme au Moyen Age, de Gilbert Dahan.

“Tout d’abord, le regard d’autrui, comme condition nécessaire de mon objectivité, est destruction de toute objectivité pour moi. Le regard d’autrui m’atteint à travers le monde et n’est pas seulement transformation de moi-même, mais metamorphose totale du monde. Je suis regardé dans um monde regardé. (...) Ce regard d’autrui se donne immédiatement comme ce par quoi la distance vient au monde au sein d’une présence sans distance. Je recule, je suis démuni de ma présence sans distance à mon monde et je suis porvu d’une distance à autrui: me voilá à quinze pas de la porte, à six métres de la chaise. (...) (... en tant que je m’éprouve regardé, se realise pour moi une présence transmodaine d’autrui: ce n’est pas en tant qu’il est “au milieu” de mon monde qu’autrui me regarde, mais c’est en tant qu’il vient vers le monde et vers moi de toute sa transcendance, c’est en tant qu’il n’est separé de moi par aucune distance, par aucun objet du monde, ni réel, ni idéal, par aucun corps du monde, mais par sa seule nature d’autrui”.Ainsi, l’apparition du regard d’autrui n’est pas apparition dans le monde: ni dans le “mien” ni dans “celui d’autrui”; et le rapport qui m’unit à autrui ne saurait être un rapport d’extériorité à l’intérieur du monde, mais, par le regard d’autrui, je fais l’épreuve concrète qu’il y a un au-delà du monde”

Sartre, O Ser e o Nada, A existência do Outro

" Le Désir humain doit porter sur um autre Désir. Pour qu’il y ait Désir humain, Il faut donc qu’il y ait tout d’abord une pluralité de Désirs ( animaux). Autrement dit, pour que la Conscience de Soi puisse naître du Sentiment de Soi, pour que la realité humaine puisse se constituer à l’intérieur de la réalité animale, Il faut que cette réalité reste essentiellemente multiple. (...) C’est pourquoi la réalité humaine ne ne peut être que sociale(...). Le Désir anthropogène, constituant un individu libre et historique conscient de sa liberte, de son histoire et, finalment, de son historicité- le Désir anthropogène diffère donc du Désir animal (...) par le fait qu’il porte sur un autre Désir. (...) Ainsi, dans le rapport entre l’homme et la femme, le Désir n’est humain que si l’un desire non pas le corps, mais le Désir de l’autre, s’il veut “posséder” ou “assimiler” le Désir pris en tant que Désir, c’est-à-dire, s’il veut être “desire” ou “aimé”, ou bien encore: “reconnu” dans sa valeur humaine. (…) Un tel Désir ne peut être qu’un Désir humain, et la réalité humaine en tant que différente de la réalité animale ne se crée que par l’action qui satisfait de tels Désirs: l’histoire humaine est l’histoire des Désirs desirés”.

Kojéve, Lições sobre a Fenomenologia do Espírito de Hegel.

"Ce qui provoque la mise à mal du conatus serait donc la présence d’autrui, la tenue en vigilance par l’éphiphanie de son visage, fragile et mystérieux, qui non seulement fait éclater les visées expansionnistes de l’essence em se refusant, absolument, à la possession, mais qui, bientôt, va faire peser sur elle “toute une charge d’indigence et de faiblesse”, tout le poids de la souffrance. Car cette rencontre d’autrui ne se produit pas dans la lumière rassurante de l’être, nul corrélat de l’intentionnalité, nul phénomène, n’em donnent la mesure. Elle assigne à une autre lumière, plus extreme et plus douloureuse, à une autre exposition, plus inquiètante et plus éblouissante: elle voue au “soleil de plomb, sans ombre protectrice” de la responsabilité. (...) Comme s’il fallait, contraint et forcé, abandonner les lieux contaminés par l’insistance du conatus, de sa propre violence, pour découvrir que le moi n’est autre que “la crise même de l’être de l’étant”, qu’il ne se met à exister comme tel qu’à l’instant où la prèsence de l’Autre l’apelle, lui et nul autre, à porter la responsabilité de tout et de tous, malgré lui, en dépit de son désir d’écarter l’insupportable de cette charge, telle donc une persécution”.

Catherine Chalier, La pérséverance Du Mal

"Grace à la création des conditions où la conscience n’est plus d’aucun secours, ou bien faire devient radicalment impossible, la complicité consciemment organizée de tous les hommes dans les regimes totalitaires s’étend aux victimes et prend ainsi un caractére vraiment total. Les S.S mêlaient les détenus -criminels, politiques, Juifs- à leurs crimes en leur confiant dans une large mesure les responsabilités de l’administration: ainsi ils les confrontaient à un dilemma sans issue: ou bien ceux-ci envoyaient leurs amis à mort, ou bien ils participaient au meutre d’autres homes qui se trouvaient leur être étrangers. Dans tous les cas, ils se voyaient contraints de se conduire en meurtriers. L’importante n’est pas seulement que la haine soit détournée des coupables ( les kapos étaient plus haïs que les S.S) mais que la ligne de démarcation entre persécuteur et persecuté, entre le meurtrier et sa victime, soit constamment estompée”.

Hannah Arendt, O sistema totalitário.

“ Vous avez été professeur; mais vous ne l’êtes plus. Vous n’êtes plus um grand monsieur. Vous êtes tout petit maintenant. Tout petit. C’est moi qui suis grand!

Resposta de um guarda da S.S a um prisioneiro judeu, relatado por David Rousset em Os dias da nossa morte.

"Vincenzo e Luigi Papazzeto wrote in their book The Brutes Have the Floor that, every time a new transport of detainees arrived at Mauthausen, Kapo August Adam picked out the professors, lawyers, priests and magistrates and cynically asked them: "Are you a lawyer? A professor? Good! Do you see this green triangle? This means I am a killer. I have five convictions on my record: one for manslaughter and four for robbery. Well, here I am in command. The world has turned upside down, did you get that? Do you need a Dolmetscher, an interpreter? Here it is!" And he was pointing to his bat, after which he striked. When he was satisfied, he formed a Scheisskompanie with those selected and sent them to clean the latrines."

“Eu bato neles o quanto posso, até ejacular. Eu tenho uma mulher e três crianças, em Breslau. Antes eu era um homem perfeitamente normal. Veja o que fizeram de mim. Agora, quando eles me dão permissão pra sair, eu não volto mais pra casa. Não posso encarar minha mulher e meus filhos face a face”

Depoimento de um guarda da S.S. a Ernst Feder.

(..) A este contexto pertence igualmente o fato da raridade de suicídios entre os prisioneiros dos campos. Os suicídios se davam com frequência ora antes da prisão, ora na deportação. Isto se explica em parte pelo fato de os comandantes dos campos se esforçavam de todas as maneiras em evitar los suicídios por serem atos espontâneos por parte das vítimas”

Starlinger, Os campos da morte.

"A noção de Ser irremissível e sem saída constitui o absurdo fulcral do Ser. O ser é o mal, não porque finito, mas porque sem limites”

Émannuel Lévinas.

A maldição do Divino 2

“L’être est essentiellement étranger et nous herte. Nous subissons son étreinte étouffante comme la nuit, mais il ne répond pas. Il est le mal d’être.”

Emmanuel Levinas

“Dans la personne de l’ostracisé, la cité expulse ce qui em elle est trop élevé et incarne le mal que peut lui venir par le haut. Dans celle du pharmakos, elle expulse ce qu’elle comporte de plus vil et qui incarne le mal qui la menace par le bas (...)Elle prend la mesure propre de l’humain em opposition d’um côté au divin et à l’héroique, de l’autre au bestial et au monstrueux”.

Jean Pierre Vernant, Mythe et tragédie en Grèce Ancienne

"Bien souvent le héros de la tragédie grecque souffre de ne plus savoir qui Il est. Aisin, après avoir violé toutes les limites, enfreint toutes les frontières et annulé toutes les differences- celle du père et du fils, de la mère et de la femme-, Oedipe connaî-il l’épouvante et la violence de l’indifférenciation. Occupant une multiplicité de places ( fils et époux, frère et père), l’interrogation lancinante sur son identité ne peut que rester sans réponse. Et l’angoisse qui em resulte n’a d’égale que La démesure de l’effraction. Le tragique viendrait donc de cet effacement des distinctions, de cette obscurité majeure soudain jetée sur les separations, sur leur pouvoir rassurant. L’éspace donéravant confus et, par là meme, souillé et impur, risquant de contaminer chacun, ne serait plus habitable sans danger, sauf à chaser celui par qui un tel malheur arrive, sauf à ostraciser le coupable, fût-il innocent à ses propres yeux”.

Cathérine Chalier, La pérseverance du Mal

Esta bela citação da Chalier deveria ser complementada pela aposição de um princípio filosófico fundamental, fora do qual a filosofia não conceberia uma representação do ente: o princípio de individuação, sem o qual nada é. O mal está na destruição dos limites que constituem e fixam cada ser em seu ser...

A maldição do Divino

A Servidão

A alteração.

"Horror do mundo exterior, questionamento das instituições e tradições sociais, religiosas e intelectuais, a profecia não se limita a ser apenas isso e a expor por esta razão o profeta a todo tipo de perseguições e ao sofrimento. Ela impõe a dor na própria alma do profeta , colocando-se contra ele. EscÂndalo do mundo, a profecia é igualmente escândalo para o profeta. Esta é seu primeiro adversário, o mais terrível por ser mais íntimo, o mais ameaçador por ser absoluto.

É pela alteração que começa a dor do profeta. Um homem torna-se outro. Ele é arrancado à sua família, a seu meio, suas condições de vida, de mentalidade, a seu temperamento e "jogado" em outro mundo. Ele é subtraído a seu próprio Eu e, transformado, não reconhece mais a si mesmo. Forja-se nele sua própria contradição: ele diz o que jamais havia pensado, ele anuncia o qjue sempre havia repelido. Sua existência é o paradoxo de seu ser. (...). Mas a aceitação do Absoluto é a fonte da miséria.Fulminado por uma ordem cujas exigências ele não diuscute e compreende, , Saul está aterrorizado de ver que é preciso submeter-se integralmente, e que arriscar-se a uma leve hesitação, equivale a tudo recusar. Saul participa a uma ordem totalmente outra, que não pode conciliar com a sua. (...) A tragédia de Saul é caso limite. Pois Saul é o único ser eleito por Deus que jamais o encontrou. Ele está encravado na clareira da história "obrada" por Deus, é o elo de uma cadeia de homens da qual deus se serve para falar ao mundo, mas o próprio Saul jamais entendeu a palavra de Deus. (...) Sua profecia é uma ruah sem davar ( linguagem), mas também sem conhecimento. (...) Este distanciamento de Deus torna a mensagem absolutamente misteriosa. Saul apenas pode decifrá-la; e ele jamais a conseguirá decifrar, é o grande fracasso de sua vida.

(...) Em Jeremias, contra este homem cuja sensibilidade natural vibra sob todos os acentos do amor, se dirige o outro. Profeta, Jeremias deve condenar tudo o que ama, família, amigos, Jerusalem e seu povo, objeto de sua nostalgia e fervor. O amor se desenraíza dele. Pela vocação profética, Jeremias é arrancado ao amor humano, a toda sensibilidade humana e terrestre de simpatia e afeição. (...) Por onde passe, suscitará a desconfiança e a confusão. (...) Ezequiel é obrigado por Deus a come um frango cozido na merda, e o obedece; Oséias, homem pudico, é ordenado a esposar uma prostituta, para mostrar o quão Jerusalém estava prostituída, e com ela dar origem a uma geração; e o faz. Isaías, homem austero e severo, é obrigado por Deus a marchar nu pela cidade por três anos, e obedece, por amor ao Absoluto.(...) A concepção de profecia que Jeremias julga verdadeira funda sua autenticidade na massa, carga imposta de fora, , de forma alguma buscada, desejada, mas inflingida por Deus."

Andre Neher.

"Mas Jesus disse-lhes: um Profeta só é desprezado em sua pátria, entre seus parentes e em sua própria casa". ( Marcos, 6, 1-6).

"Reste que, comme la première insomnie, cette tenue en vigilance par la présence d'autrui ne se choisit pas mais s'impose et affecte de l'infinie souffrance de ne pas être à la hauteur de ce qui arrive: la révelation de la destination éthique du projet d'être. Comme si, éblouissement ou brûlure, la vie était, par-delá le voir, dejà la douleur de l'oeil excédé de lumière; par-delà le contact, dejà l'ignition de la peau touchant- mais ne touchant pas- l'insaissisable. Le Même dérangé par l'Autre qui l'exalte".

Cathérine Chalier, La persévérance du Mal.

...se a linguagem como "habitar do Ser" do protestante "que não ousa dizer o nome" Heidegger não é a versão ontológico-laica deste dom maldito de alteridade- que se diz, se presentifica no Dizer- que os profetas experimentaram, desta intrusão fulminante do Absoluto no Finito que força o finito a tomar figuras e a seguir trajetórias quase monstruosas para se pôr à altura do Absoluto, que eu cegue neste exato momento!!

A posteriade disto, do caráter "destrutivo" , do Totalmente Outro, da intrusão do Absoluto se encontra na teoria romântica de arte como fascinação, na concepção do sublime ou no niilismo suicidaire das vanguardas, que assumiram radicalmente a finitude da arte e de tudo o mais- como uma impossibilidade de dar uma forma total , frontal e única ao mundo total e único que o homem queria forjar, à semelhança de Deus, na cabeça; então, temos o que? cacos, estilhaços, deuses que, à semelhança de Dionhysius, são restos mortais da Totalidade doadora e divinatória que nos acena na primeva Grécia, de uma presença para sempre desaparecida mas que, como toda presença, deixa rastros- cadáveres, memórias, epifanias- a serem, não mais decifrados ( a totalidade a que pertenciam se extinguiu, portanto o contexto e a possibilidade de sua significação idem) mas preservados e conservados na obra como instância: a obra - Dictum-, seja ela profecia, pensamento ou arte, é uma urna funerária...